Understanding State and Non-State Actors

Threats from state and non-state actors target the same individuals and entities frequently, but not in every case, and the tools necessary to respond to the two types of threats overlap but are not the same.

Threats from non-state actors commonly emerge from the types of harassment that typically come to mind with the term “online harassment,” but their effects go far beyond those often implied by this term, and include myriad concrete harms and physical dangers. These threats include threats to advocates’ accounts and public image, such as hacking, phishing, and impersonation; threats to their data and privacy, such as doxxing and leaking; threats to their well-being, such as threats, harassment, and dogpiling; and threats that cross the barrier between online and offline.

These attacks arise from coordinated groups of antagonistic individuals without direct access to the power of the state, but with significant technical expertise, organized numbers, and a lot of time on their hands. Between 2014 and 2021, many of these attacks were organized and carried out on a now-defunct platform called Kiwifarms; now, this organizing occurs on other social media and message board sites and encrypted messaging apps such as Telegram.

Non-state actor threats often result from distributed campaigns of mass public communication targeted at an individual or group, resulting in decentralized and difficult-to-predict acts of terror and violence from the public against that individual or group.

With the rise in anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in states with conservative-leaning legislatures, many advocates are encountering the threat of state repression for the first time. In particular, professional non-advocates and non-professional advocates may be politically aligned with LGBTQ+ liberation generally, but may view the state as a fundamentally benevolent institution whose purpose and effect should be and is to protect them from bad actors. Even professional advocates, who may have a greater understanding of the history of our movement and the context of the history of the criminalization of LGBTQ+ identity and communities, are emerging from a years-long period of relative respite during which many states at least paid lip service to gay rights. Accordingly, any organization or institution doing any advocacy to advance the cause of LGBTQ+ liberation on any scale must grapple with the likelihood of threats from state as well as non-state actors. The technical and practical tools and strategies to protect against threats from and react to attacks by state and non-state actors are different. For example, it’s important to consider storing sensitive information to minimize exposure to data breaches through phishing or hacking and to subpoenas by law enforcement.